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Abstract. HiP-HOPS is a model-based approach for assessing the dependability 
of safety-critical systems. The method combines models, logic, probabilities and 
nature-inspired algorithms to provide advanced capabilities for design optimisa-
tion, requirement allocation and safety argument generation. To deal with dy-
namic systems, HiP-HOPS has introduced temporal operators and a temporal 
logic to represent and assess event sequences in component failure modelling. 
Although this approach has been shown to work, it is not entirely consistent with 
the way designers tend to express operational dynamics in models which show 
mode and state sequences. To align HiP-HOPS better with typical design tech-
niques, in this paper, we extend the method with the ability to explicitly consider 
different modes of operation. With this added capability HiP-HOPS can create 
and analyse temporal fault trees from architectural models of a system which are 
augmented with mode information.  
Keywords: Model-based safety analysis; Fault Tree Analysis; HiP-HOPS; dy-
namic systems; temporal fault trees. 
1 Introduction 
To overcome the limitations of classical approaches to dependability analysis like 
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) [1], in the 
last two decades, research has focused on simplifying dependability analysis by looking 
at how dependability artefacts can be automatically synthesized from system models. 
This has led to the field of model-based safety analysis (MBSA) [2]. MBSA approaches 
offer significant advantages over classical approaches as they utilise software automa-
tion and integration with design models to simplify the analysis of complex safety-
critical systems. Over the years, several approaches, e.g., Failure Propagation and 
Transformation Notation (FPTN) [3], Hierarchically Performed Hazard Origin and 
Propagation Studies (HiP-HOPS) [4], AltaRica [5], FSAP-NuSMV [6], and AADL 
with its error annex [7], have been developed to facilitate MBSA of complex systems. 
An overview of these approaches is available in [8, 9]. These approaches usually com-
bine different classical safety analysis approaches to allow the analysts to perform 
safety analyses automatically or semi-automatically. For example, HiP-HOPS, a state-
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of-the-art MBSA approach, enhances an architectural model of a system with logical 
failure annotations to allow safety studies such as FTA and FMEA. In this way it shows 
how the failure of a single component or combinations of failures of multiple compo-
nents can lead to system failures.  
Early versions of the HiP-HOPS method used the classical combinatorial model of 
traditional FTA. In this model, systems failures are caused by logical combinations of 
component failures as these combine and propagate through the system architecture. 
However, in modern large-scale and complex systems, system behaviour is dynamic 
over time. This could be due to their capability to operate in multiple modes, e.g., an 
aircraft can operate in take-off, flight, and landing modes or it could be because the 
system behaviour changes in response to different events. This dynamic system behav-
iour leads to a variety of dynamic failure characteristics such as functionally dependent 
events and priorities of failure events. It is not only combinations of events that matter 
but sequences too. As systems are getting more complex and their behaviour becomes 
more dynamic, capturing this dynamic behaviour and the many possible interactions 
between the components is necessary for accurate failure modelling.  
There are different possibilities to model the dynamic behaviour of a system. On the 
one hand, it is possible to directly specify the dynamic failure behaviour through dy-
namic dependability formalisms [9, 10]. One example is Pandora TFTs [10], where 
dynamic behaviours are modelled using temporal gates and temporal laws are used for 
qualitative analysis. Pandora can be used in the context of HiP-HOPS for assessing 
event sequencing in dynamic systems. A difficulty with this approach is that the dy-
namic operation is not explicitly given in a system design model, but has to be intro-
duced later on in the failure modeling where event sequences are described. This can 
make application of the method counterintuitive to designers who are used to describing 
dynamics directly in system models using mode and state diagrams. The difficulty can 
be overcome by modelling dynamic behaviour in state automata linked to an architec-
tural model of the system and by synthesizing fault trees by traversing the combined 
model [11]. However, in this approach important information related to the sequencing 
of events is eventually lost, as the resultant fault trees are combinatorial and do not have 
temporal semantics. This, however, is not ideal since there are circumstances where the 
order of two or more events is significant and changes the effects of failure and the 
capability to recover [10]. 
The main contribution of this paper is the proposal of a dynamic fault propagation 
approach which extends the HiP-HOPS technique with explicit representation of sys-
tem modes and states. The approach generates Pandora temporal fault trees which rep-
resent accurately the dynamic failure behaviour of the system without any loss of the 
significance that the sequencing of events may have. The approach has been illustrated 
on a model of a twin-engine aircraft fuel distribution system.  
2 Background 
2.1 An overview of the HiP-HOPS Technique 
Hierarchically Performed Hazard Origin & Propagation Studies or HiP-HOPS [4] is 
one of the more advanced and well supported compositional model-based safety anal-
ysis techniques. It can automatically generate fault trees and FMEA tables from ex-
tended system models, as well as perform quantitative analysis on the fault trees. It also 
has the ability to perform multi-objective optimisation of the system models [12]. It can 
semi-automatically allocate safety requirements to the system components in the form 
of Safety Integrity Levels (SILs) which automates some of the processes for the ASIL 
allocation specified in ISO 26262. 
The approach consists of three main phases: a) system modelling and failure anno-
tation b) fault tree synthesis and c) fault tree analysis and FMEA synthesis 
The system modelling and failure annotation phase allows analysts to provide infor-
mation to the HiP-HOPS tool on how the different system components are intercon-
nected and how they can fail. The architectural model of the system shows the inter-
connections between the components of the system and the architecture can be arranged 
hierarchically, i.e., the system consists of different subsystems and subsystems have 
their own components. Modelling and annotation of the system with dependability in-
formation can be done using popular modelling tools like Matlab Simulink or Simula-
tionX. The dependability related information includes component failure modes and 
Boolean expressions for output deviations, which describe how a component can fail 
and how it responds to failures that occur in other parts of the system. The expression 
for the output deviations show how the deviations in the component outputs can be 
caused either by the internal failure of that component or by corresponding deviations 
in the component’s input. Such deviations can be user defined but typically include 
omission (O) of output, unexpected commission (C) of output, incorrect output, or too 
late or early arrival of output [13] (see Fig. 1). If available, quantitative data can also 
be entered to facilitate quantitative analysis in a later phase through parametric distri-
bution functions (e.g. failure rate or scale and shape parameters of exponential and 
Weibull distributions, respectively). Note that while annotating components, HiP-
HOPS considers that a component has a fixed set of nominal and failure behaviour, and 
these behaviours do not change over time. For instance, consider the component shown 
in Fig. 1, where the annotation of the output deviation of component A is shown in 
Table 1.  
Once the components in the system model are annotated with failure expressions, 
the annotated model is used by HiP-HOPS to synthesize fault trees. This process starts 
with a deviation of system output (top event) and traverses the system architecture 
backwards, i.e., from the system level outputs to the component level failures, to exam-
ine the propagation of failures through connections between components. In this way 
the process traverses the whole architecture and combines the local fault trees from the 
individual components until no connected components remain. The result is a single 
fault tree (or set of fault trees) which represents all the possible combinations of com-
ponent failure that can lead to the system failure. 
 
 
Fig. 1. An example component 
Table 1. Annotation of component with static behaviour in HiP-HOPS 
Component Name Output Deviation Failure Expression 
A O-Out A.Fail + O-A.In 
 
In the final phase, the synthesised fault trees are analysed both qualitatively and 
quantitatively. Qualitative analysis results in minimal cut sets (MCSs), which represent 
the smallest combinations of failure events that can cause the system failure. In addition 
to that, FMEA tables are generated automatically showing the connections between 
component failures and system failures. In quantitative analysis, probability of system 
failure is estimated based on the failure rate/probability of the basic events. 
Generally, temporal dependencies among the events are not considered in FTA. 
However, HiP-HOPS is able to consider them using Pandora temporal fault trees 
(TFTs) [10]. Pandora uses temporal gates such as Priority-AND (PAND) and Priority-
OR (POR) to represent temporal relations among events.  The PAND gate represents a 
sequence between events X and Y where event X must occur before event Y, but both 
the events must occur. The POR gate also represents a sequence between the events, 
but it specifies an ordered disjunction rather than an ordered conjunction, i.e., event X 
must occur before event Y if event Y occurs at all. In this paper, the symbols ‘⊲’ and ‘|’ 
are used to represent PAND and POR operation respectively in logical expressions. 
Additionally, ‘+’ and ‘.’ are used to represent logical OR and AND operations. 
2.2 Dynamic Behaviour and Challenges in Dependability Analysis 
In modern systems, big tasks are often divided into smaller tasks and are processed 
in different stages of the operation. In this way, resources are utilised in a sequence of 
different stages, and in each of those stages, a set of different functions are performed 
to complete the overall task. For example, the operation of the Aircraft Fuelling Sys-
tems (AFS) in modern aircraft can be divided into modes, whereby some of the opera-
tions may take place before the flight and some may take place during the flight. 
Throughout the process, at any particular point in time, some of the system components 
may act as active components and some others may act as passive components. By 
active at a point in time, we mean those components which are engaged in system op-
eration at that particular time. On the other hand, inactive components are those which 
are idle or switched off, i.e., not involved in any operation at that point in time and 
waiting to be reactivated by the system. 
Sometimes a system may have to perform a set of variable functions and, to facilitate 
this, a variable configuration of the system is obtained by deliberately activating and 
deactivating a selected number of components. A second scenario could be that a sys-
tem is performing a fixed set of functions, and in the presence of a failure, the system 
may sacrifice some of its non-critical functions and go to a degraded operational mode 
by only doing the critical functions with a limited number of components with a differ-
ent configuration. Additionally, to make the safety critical system tolerant to faults, 
many systems have fault tolerance strategies built in. As part of such a fault tolerant 
strategy, in the presence of faults, systems may reconfigure by using spare (cold or hot) 
components to respond to the faults and continue the nominal behaviour. 
If we want to analyse such a system with techniques like HiP-HOPS, we will soon 
be faced with difficulties caused by the dynamic behaviour of the system. Temporal 
fault trees capture temporal dependencies, but for multi-state systems, it is difficult to 
precisely define the nominal behaviour of the system because it has different behaviours 
in different modes. Therefore, it is equally difficult to define the potential deviations 
from the nominal behaviour. Another thing to note is that different selections of com-
ponents are activated and deactivated to obtain a desirable configuration; therefore 
some of the components may be irrelevant in some of the modes, and thus so are their 
failure modes. As a result, it is a challenge to take this mode dependent behaviour into 
account and represent it in an understandable and manageable format to facilitate dy-
namic failure propagation studies. 
3 Dynamic Fault Propagation Studies using HiP-HOPS 
3.1 Representing dynamic behaviour using mode charts 
As already mentioned, we consider that in the presence of failure a system can be-
have dynamically by reconfiguring itself to deliver a variable set of functions or a single 
set of function with some alternative configurations. That means the configuration of 
the system may be dependent on the mode in which the system is operating, i.e., a 
distinct configuration/architecture can be associated with a distinct mode of operation. 
We propose to use mode charts [14] to represent the functional, dynamic behaviour of 
the systems, where each mode will represent a distinct configuration and the transition 
conditions will be the events associated with the component failures. Please note that 
in future work this concept will be applied in a more general sense, i.e., by also consid-
ering events that can transition the system state between operational modes; which is 
out of the scope of this paper. 
A mode chart 𝑀 could be formally defined as: 
  
𝑀 = (𝑄, Σ, 𝛿, 𝑞0)                                (1)                                 
 
where 𝑄 is the set of all possible modes, Σ is the set of all possible events, 𝛿 is the tran-
sition function 𝛿: 𝑄 × Σ → Q, and 𝑞0 is the initial mode. The initial mode represents the 
fully functional architecture of the system where all the system components are opera-
tive and all functionality of the system is provided. Each of the other modes represents 
a degraded architecture (a distinct configuration) which is formed due to the presence 
of some failure, however, this architecture is still able to provide system functionality. 
We make the distinction between these modes based on the criticality of the configura-
tions they represent:  
 Critical mode: any further component failure will result in the system failure.  
 Non-critical mode: the system failure cannot not be reached directly and further 
configurations can be formed from the present configuration. 
Fig. 2 shows different modes, 𝑀𝑖 , connected via transition events, 𝑇𝑖 , which cause 
mode changes. According to the criticality of the modes, they are classified as non-
critical modes = {M1, M2, M3} and critical modes = {M4, M5, M6}. 
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Fig. 2. Concept of mode based behaviour modelling; dashed and solid rounded rectangles  
represent the critical and non-critical modes respectively 
 
To describe the dynamic behaviour of a system using mode charts, we would have 
to identify: (i) all possible functional modes, (ii) all possible conditions that can trigger 
transitions between those functional modes, and (iii) the critical and the non-critical 
modes.  
3.2 Annotation of mode based behaviour of components 
As mentioned earlier, for static fault propagation studies, the HiP-HOPS technique 
considers the system architecture as static and annotates the systems components with 
a fixed set of failure behaviours. These behaviours are considered the default behav-
iours of the components. However, for dynamic fault propagation studies, we need to 
annotate the components with mode-based behaviour. In this paper, the system compo-
nents are regarded as non-repairable and have defined failure behaviour for different 
critical modes as the system failure could be reached directly from those modes. The 
components are non-repairable to ensure that the mode chart will be loop free, i.e., a 
directed acyclic graph.  
Note that a component does not have to have a failure behaviour for all the critical 
modes because it may be (i) inactive in a particular mode, (ii) failed prior to entering a 
mode, or (iii) masked due to the failure of other components. In the first case the failure 
behaviour of that component is irrelevant in this mode. In the second case, the compo-
nent has already failed before coming to the present mode; therefore, the failure behav-
iour of the component is already addressed in any of the prior modes. In the third case, 
the component itself is not failed; however, its activity does not have any effect in the 
system because of some other reason, e.g., failure of other components. 
 
Table 2. Example of mode-based failure annotation of component 
Component 
Name 
Output 
Deviation 
Failure Expression 
Mode M1 Mode M2 Mode M3 
A O-Out E1 + E2 + E3 N/A E4. E5 
 
For example, let us consider that in a functional mode chart there are three critical 
modes M1, M2, and M3 respectively; the component A is active in mode M1 and M3, 
but not in mode M2. Therefore, we have to define the failure behaviour of component 
A only for modes M1 and M3. The annotation can be represented in tabular format as 
displayed in Table 2, where Ei denotes the i-th failure event of component A. If the 
failure specification of a component is the same in all its modes, the mode-based be-
havior reduces to their default behaviour as defined in the static analysis.  
3.3 Synthesis and Analysis of Annotated System Models 
Once the mode chart of the system behaviour and the mode based failure data have 
been defined, the mode chart and the annotated architectures can then be synthesised 
using the HiP-HOPS technique. This phase operates by examining how the failure of 
components propagates through system architecture and through different modes in the 
mode chart to cause system failure. Therefore, the first task of this phase is to identify 
the parts of the system model that act as the system outputs, and then define system 
failures (top events of the fault trees) for each of the critical modes in the mode chart. 
The top event of a mode specific fault tree is represented in the following form: 
Output_Deviation_Name<mode_name> 
 
where the mode_name inside the angle brackets defines the mode from which the 
causes for output deviation defined by the Output_Deviation_Name are required 
to be derived. Similarly, mode specific basic events can be named as: 
event_name<mode_name>. 
      The system operation modes denote non-overlapping system states. Accordingly, 
the system failure condition is defined as the disjunction of the causes of output devia-
tion in all the critical modes. That is: 
 
O_D_X= O_D_X<mode1> + O_D_X<mode2> + … + O_D_X<moden>    (2) 
 
where O_D_X denotes the output deviation X. 
In the synthesis process, each top event is considered separately and fault trees are 
generated using the HiP-HOPS technique by traversing both the mode chart and the 
system architecture. This process differs from HiP-HOPS’ static fault propagation stud-
ies in that now sets of fault trees are generated for all the critical modes whereas in the 
static studies with a single operation mode only a single set of fault trees was created 
to represent the failure behaviour of the whole system. The fault tree synthesis process 
is now divided into two connected phases: 
 Architecture traversal: represents the causes of system failure from that particular 
critical mode (as it is done in static studies). 
 Mode chart traversal: represents the causes of reaching a particular critical mode 
from the initial mode. 
A graphical overview of the fault tree synthesis process is shown in Fig. 3 where IM 
denotes initial mode, NM denotes non-critical modes, and CM denotes critical modes. 
We can see that all the CM lead directly to the system failure occurrence. Note that the 
arrows showing the direction of mode-chart traversal are in opposite direction of mode 
transitions.
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Fig. 3. A graphical overview of the fault tree synthesis process 
 
The two traversal steps generate two interconnected fault trees. The architecture tra-
versal starts with the failure logic of the system output that is defined for this critical 
mode. It then traverses the static architecture to examine the propagation of failure 
through the components to the system output. After that, the mode based local fault 
trees of all involved components are created and this process continues until no con-
nected components remain. Once all the mode based local fault trees are created, they 
are combined together to obtain a single set of fault trees. 
The second set of fault trees is generated by traversing the mode chart. We can con-
sider this as a single source single destination graph traversal problem, where the source 
is the critical mode under consideration and the destination is the initial mode. This 
mode-traversal process will be backward from an internal mode towards the initial 
mode. In every iteration, the process replaces the current mode by its immediately pre-
ceding mode(s) and transition conditions from the preceding mode(s) to the current 
mode. This process will continue until the initial mode is reached. As a result of this 
process, we obtain all the possible combinations of events (component failures) that 
cause the system to go to the mode in question from the initial mode. If the initial mode 
is the critical mode then there is no need to traverse the mode chart. 
In order to obtain the complete failure behaviour we need to combine these two sets 
of fault trees. The system can only fail if it reaches the critical mode of operation first 
and then from the critical mode to the system failure. Hence, when combining fault tree 
models generated from mode and architecture traversals, we need to maintain the se-
quence between them. We can use a PAND gate to combine these two sets of fault trees 
and define the system failure caused by the mode i denoted top-event, TEi: 
𝑇𝐸𝑖 = 𝐹𝑇𝐴𝑖 ⊲ 𝐹𝑇𝐴𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒                                   (3) 
 
where FTAi denotes the fault tree obtained from the mode-chart traversal for the mode 
i and FTAarchitecture denotes the fault tree obtained from the architectural  traversal. 
When fault trees for all the critical modes are obtained, they can be linked with the 
OR logic to obtain the complete failure behaviour of the system. Let us assume that the 
system has N critical modes, then the system failure, TE, is defined as: 
 
TE=TE1+…+TEi+…+TEN                                        (4) 
 
where TEi is defined in Eq. (3). 
Qualitative analysis could be performed on the Eq. (4) so as to remove redundant 
events and minimise the expression into a set of minimal cut sequences (MCSQs). 
MCSQs are the smallest sequence of events that are necessary and sufficient to cause 
the top event. In this paper, Pandora temporal fault trees are used to illustrate the idea 
and the methodologies proposed by Walker [10] to obtain MCSQs are applied. After 
minimization, the quantitative analysis of MCSQs can be performed using the ap-
proaches described in [15, 16], however, it is out of scope of this paper. 
4 Case study 
To illustrate the idea of dynamic fault propagation studies, we use the case study of 
a hypothetical twin engine aircraft fuel distribution system, shown in Fig. 4. 
The system has two fuel tanks TL (Tank Left) and TR (Tank Right); three valves 
VL (Valve Left), VR (Valve Right), and VC (Valve Centre); two pumps PL (Pump 
Left) and PR (Pump Right). Under normal operating conditions, pump PL provides fuel 
to the Left Engine from tank TL through valve VL and pump PR provides fuel to the 
Right Engine from tank TR through valve VR. We can denote this as M_TLTR mode 
of system operation and in this mode, the valve VC is kept closed. Now, if we hypoth-
esise a failure such that VR is stuck closed, then fuel flow to the Right Engine from TR 
is stopped. In this condition, the system can reconfigure itself by opening valve VC, 
hence continue fuel flow to the Right Engine from TL. We denote this as M_TL mode. 
Similarly, the system can operate in M_TR mode by providing fuel to Left Engine from 
TR in the condition that VL is stuck closed. 
 
 
Fig. 4. Architecture of twin engine aircraft fuel system 
 
In the first stage of dynamic fault propagation studies, we need to annotate the com-
ponents in the system architecture with mode based behaviour. After that, we have to 
identify the system output. Provision of fuel to each engine could be considered as the 
system output, and thus failure to provide fuel to any of the engines could be considered 
as a hazardous condition. Thus, failures of the engines are not considered here. As the 
fuel to the Left Engine and the Right Engine is provided in a similar fashion with the 
opposite set of components, for brevity, we concentrate on the failure of the system to 
provide fuel to the Left Engine alone.  
As mentioned earlier, the system can operate in M_TLTR, M_TL, and M_TR 
modes. From the architecture in Fig. 4, we can see that the failure of pump PL will 
cause no fuel flow to the left engine in any mode, hence failure of pump PL can be 
considered as a single point of failure. For this reason, all the modes are considered as 
critical modes as described in Section 3.1. The mode-based annotations of the system 
components are shown in Table 3. In this table, the value N/A means that the behaviour 
of the component is not applicable (relevant) in this mode because it has no activity in 
this mode. We also need to define the mode chart. M_TLTR is the initial mode where 
all the system components are available. M_TL and M_TR are two degraded modes 
where the system can provide functionality, in this case, provision of fuel to the left 
engine, with reduced number of components. A transition from M_TLTR mode to 
M_TL mode will happen when fuel flow through VR will stop (i.e., O-VR.Out) and the 
system will enter to M_TR mode from M_TLTR mode when fuel flow through VL 
stops (i.e., O-VL.Out) (see Fig. 5). 
In Table 3, ‘O-’ stands for Omission. It can also be seen that failure expressions of 
some components are the same in different modes. For example, failure expressions for 
VL is VL.Fail + O-TL.Out for both M_TLTR and M_TL modes. However, we 
treat them differently under the assumption that the probability of failure of a compo-
nent can be different in different modes due to the change in workloads in different 
modes, e.g. see [17]. Consider, for instance, each of the engines of the system in Fig. 4 
consumes X litres of fuel per hour. Therefore, while the system operates in M_TLTR 
mode X litres of fuel flow through both VL and VR. Now, if for some reason VR gets 
stuck closed then the system will switch to M_TL mode, meaning that the left tank will 
provide fuel to both engines. This results in double fuel flow from left tank through the 
VL, which means the workload on valve VL and tank TL get doubled, and this in turn 
affects the failure probability of these components. As a result, although having the 
same failure expression in different modes, the behaviour is still treated differently due 
to the change in failure probability.  
 
Table 3. Mode-based annotations of the components of system in Fig. 4 
Component 
Output 
Deviations 
Failure Expression 
M_TLTR M_TL M_TR 
Left Engine O-Out O-PL.Out O-PL.Out O-PL.Out 
PL O-Out PL.Fail 
PL.Fail + 
O-VL.Out 
PL.Fail + 
O-VC.Out 
PR O-Out PR.Fail 
PR.Fail + 
O-VC.Out 
PR.Fail + 
O-VR.Out 
VL O-Out 
VL.Fail+ 
O-TL.Out 
VL.Fail + 
O-TL.Out 
N/A 
VR O-Out 
VR.Fail+ 
O-TR.Out 
N/A 
VR.Fail + 
O-TR.Out 
VC O-Out N/A 
VC.Fail + 
O-VL.Out 
VC.Fail + 
O-VR.Out 
TL O-Out 
TL.Empty+      
TL.Block 
TL.Empty + 
TL.Block 
N/A 
TR O-Out 
TR.Empty+    
TR.Block 
N/A TR.Empty + 
TR.Block 
 
LE, PL, PR, VL, 
VR, TL, TR
LE, PL, PR, 
VL, VC, TL
LE, PL, PR, 
VR, VC, TR
O-VR.Out
O-VL.Out
M_TLTR 
M_TL 
M_TR 
 
Fig. 5. Mode chart with active components listed in the modes 
 
For fault tree synthesis from the annotated system architecture and mode chart, we 
defined the output deviation of the system as a disjunction of output deviations in all 
critical modes as follow: 
 
O-Left_Engine.Out = O-Left_Engine.Out<M_TLTR>  
        + O-Left_Engine.Out<M_TL>  
        + O-Left_Engine.Out<M_TR> 
   
 In the above expression, O-Left_Engine.Out represents the output deviation 
of the system, i.e., omission of fuel flow to the left engine.  
O-Left_Engine.Out<M_TLTR>, O-Left_Engine.Out<M_TL>, and O-
Left_Engine.Out<M_TR> represent the output deviation in modes M_TLTR, 
M_TL, and M_TR respectively, which are essentially the top events of fault trees for 
the respective modes. Fault trees for each of the modes can be synthesised following 
the process described in Section 3.3. 
Firstly, for the initial mode, M_TLTR, as mentioned in Section 3.3, we need to traverse 
the system architecture only based on the failure annotations (see Table 3). 
  
O-Left_Engine.Out<M_TLTR> = O-PL.Out<M_TLTR> 
   = PL.Fail<M_TLTR> 
 
For modes M_TL and M_TR, as they are critical but not initial modes, we need to 
obtain two fault trees. Consider the M_TL mode: to obtain the cause of system failure, 
we can start with the following expression (cf. Eq. (3)).   
 
O-Left_Engine.Out<M_TL>={M_TL} ⊲ O-Left_Engine.Out<M_TL>  
 
On the right hand side of the above expression, ‘⊲’ represents a logical PAND op-
eration. The left operand {M_TL} of the PAND operator represents the causes of en-
tering the mode M_TL from the initial mode. On the other hand, the right operand (O-
Left_Engine.Out<M_TL>) represents the causes of system failure from mode 
M_TL.  Each of these operands represents a top event for two different fault trees and 
the fault tree can be obtained using the mode chart and architecture traversal process as 
follows. Data from Table 3 is used in the traversal process. 
 
Mode Chart Traversal: 
{M_TL}= {M_TLTR}. O-VR.Out<M_TLTR> 
= O-VR.Out<M_TLTR> 
= VR.Fail<M_TLTR> + O-TR.Out<M_TLTR> 
= VR.Fail<M_TLTR> + TR.Empty<M_TLTR> + TR.Block<M_TLTR> 
 
Architecture traversal: 
O-Left_Engine.Out<M_TL> = O-PL.Out<M_TL> 
= PL.Fail<M_TL> + O-VL.Out<M_TL> 
= PL.Fail<M_TL> + VL.Fail<M_TL> + O-TL.Out<M_TL> 
= PL.Fail<M_TL> + VL.Fail<M_TL> + TL.Empty<M_TL> 
 + TL.Block<M_TL> 
 
Combining the results obtained from above two steps the failure behaviour of the 
system outputs from the M_TL mode is written as:  
O-Left_Engine.Out<M_TL>=(VR.Fail<M_TLTR>+ 
TR.Empty<M_TLTR> + TR.Block<M_TLTR>) ⊲ (PL.Fail<M_TL>  
+ VL.Fail<M_TL> + TL.Empty<M_TL> + TL.Block<M_TL>) 
 
Similarly, the causes of system failure from mode M_TR can be obtained as: 
O-Left_Engine.Out<M_TR>=(VL.Fail<M_TLTR>+ 
TL.Empty<M_TLTR> + TL.Block<M_TLTR>) ⊲ (PL.Fail<M_TR>  
+ VC.Fail<M_TR> +VR.Fail<M_TR> + TR.Empty<M_TR> 
+ TR.Block<M_TR>) 
 
Now, the complete failure behaviour of the system can be obtained by taking logical 
OR of the individual failure behaviour in different modes (cf. Eq. (4)). 
O-Left_Engine.Out= PL.Fail<M_TLTR>+ [(VR.Fail<M_TLTR> 
+ TR.Empty<M_TLTR> + TR.Block<M_TLTR>) ⊲ (PL.Fail<M_TL>  
+ [VL.Fail<M_TL> + TL.Empty<M_TL> + TL.Block<M_TL>)] 
+(VL.Fail<M_TLTR>+ TL.Empty<M_TLTR> + TL.Block<M_TLTR>) 
⊲ (PL.Fail<M_TR> + VC.Fail<M_TR> +VR.Fail<M_TR>  
+ TR.Empty<M_TR> + TR.Block<M_TR>)] 
 
From a closer look at the architecture of Fig. 4, we can see that the work pattern or 
workload on pump PL and PR remains the same in all the modes. For this reason, failure 
behaviour of these components can be considered to be mode independent, i.e., 
PL.Fail<M_TLTR> ⇔  PL.Fail<M_TL> ⇔  PL.Fail<M_TR> ⇔ 
PL.Fail. Therefore, the above expression can be written as: 
O-Left_Engine.Out= PL.Fail+ [(VR.Fail<M_TLTR> 
+ TR.Empty<M_TLTR> + TR.Block<M_TLTR>) ⊲ (PL.Fail  
+ VL.Fail<M_TL> + TL.Empty<M_TL> + TL.Block<M_TL>)] 
+ [(VL.Fail<M_TLTR>+ TL.Empty<M_TLTR> + TL.Block<M_TLTR>) 
⊲ (PL.Fail + VC.Fail<M_TR> +VR.Fail<M_TR> + TR.Empty<M_TR> 
+ TR.Block<M_TR>)] 
 
This fault tree expression now shows the causes of omission of fuel to the left engine 
form all the relevant modes. Using a prototype version of the HiP-HOPS tool, the min-
imal cut sequences to cause the system failure are calculated, and shown in Table 4. In 
this table, basic events are replaced by their IDs as: X1 = PL.Fail, X2 = 
VL.Fail<M_TLTR>, X3 = VL.Fail<M_TL>, X4 = VR.Fail<M_TLTR>, X5 = 
VR.Fail<M_TR>, X6 = VC.Fail<M_TR>, X7 = TL.Empty<M_TLTR>, X8 = 
TL.Block<M_TLTR>, X9 = TL.Empty<M_TL>, X10 = TL.Block<M_TL>,  
X11 = TR.Empty<M_TLTR>, X12 = TR.Block<M_TLTR>, 
X13 = TR.Empty<M_TR>, X14= TR.Block<M_TR>. 
 
 
Table 4. Minimal cut sequences that can cause the system failure in Fig. 4. 
MCSQs MCSQs 
X1 X2 | X6 . X2 ⊲ X5 . X2 | X13 . X2 | X14 
X4 ⊲ X3 . X4 | X9 . X4 | X10 X2 | X6 . X2 | X5 . X2 ⊲ X13 . X2 | X14 
X4 | X3 . X4 ⊲ X9 . X4 | X10 X2 | X6 . X2 | X5 . X2 | X13 . X2 ⊲ X14 
X4 | X3 . X4 | X9 . X4 ⊲ X10 X7 ⊲ X6 . X7 | X5 . X7 | X13 . X7 | X14 
X11 ⊲ X3 . X11 | X9 . X11 | X10 X7 | X6 . X7 ⊲ X5 . X7 | X13 . X7 | X14 
X11 | X3 . X11 ⊲ X9 . X11 | X10 X7 | X6 . X7 | X5 . X7 ⊲ X13 . X7 | X14 
X11 | X3 . X11 | X9 . X11 ⊲ X10 X7 | X6 . X7 | X5 . X7 | X13 . X7 ⊲ X14 
X12 ⊲ X3 . X12 | X9 . X12 | X10 X8 ⊲ X6 . X8 |X5 . X8 | X13 . X8 | X14 
X12 | X3 . X12 ⊲ X9 . X12 | X10 X8 | X6 . X8 ⊲ X5 . X8 | X13 . X8 | X14 
X12 | X3 . X12 | X9 . X12 ⊲ X10 X8 | X6 . X8 | X5 . X8 ⊲ X13 . X8 | X14 
X2 ⊲ X6 . X2 | X5 . X2 | X13 . X2 | X14 X8 | X6 . X8 |X5 . X8 | X13 . X8 ⊲ X14 
5 Conclusion 
In this paper, we pointed out that the dynamic behaviour of systems makes it difficult 
to precisely define the nominal and failure behaviour of systems, thus complicating 
dependability analysis processes. As a potential remedy to the above problem, we pro-
pose the use of mode charts to define dynamic behaviour of systems, and subsequently 
annotate the components in the system architecture with their mode based behaviour. 
The proposed approach extends the state-of-the-art model-based dependability analysis 
approach, HiP-HOPS, by extending the existing phases of the approach for dynamic 
fault propagation studies.  
The annotation phase has been extended by annotating system components with 
mode-based dynamic behaviour. The synthesis phase has been extended by providing 
ways to generate temporal fault trees by examining the system model and how the fail-
ure of components propagates through the system architecture and the different modes 
in the mode chart to cause system failure. Finally, in the analysis phase, minimal cut 
sequences are generated by analysing the temporal fault trees. As a whole, this exten-
sion to HiP-HOPS combines the advantages of the existing HiP-HOPS approach — 
semi-automatic generation of system-wide failure propagation information from an an-
notated system model — with the benefits of forms of representation better suited to 
dynamic systems, such as mode charts. This combination allows designers to model 
more complex dynamic scenarios in a more intuitive way than simply using temporal 
expressions and logic. It also allows them to perform compositional dynamic dependa-
bility analysis of complex systems by generating temporal fault trees. This work en-
riches the semantics of HiP-HOPS and has the potential to be combined with the other 
advanced features of HiP-HOPS, such as architecture optimisation, maintenance, safety 
requirement allocation, and safety case generation for dynamic systems. However, the 
scalability of this approach for analysis of large-scale systems is yet to be verified.   
Some of our current work is focused on continuing development of the techniques as 
part of HiP-HOPS tool. 
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